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Human Capital Investment with Competitive Labor Search
*
 
We study human capital accumulation in an environment of competitive search. Given that 
unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger 
debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of 
employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. 
The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too much unemployment, underinvestment by 
the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system 
funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency. More generally, differences in education 
funding can account for cross-country variations in wage inequality. 
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There is some agreement that the average stock of human capital in a society plays
an important role in shaping economic development and growth. It is therefore
not surprising that economists are interested in possible sources of ineﬃcient
schooling decisions and corresponding remedies. Capital market failure has been
identiﬁed as an important – and perhaps the most important – reason for underin-
vestment in human capital. It is argued that the poor who have to rely on external
sources to pay for education may lack credit opportunities or face worse capital
market conditions than the rich and are consequently underrepresented among
students.1 While contributions supporting this view highlight information fric-
tions in credit arrangements, they put less emphasis on labor market outcomes.
Usually a frictionless labor market environment is adopted where all workers
ﬁnd employment at competitive, market–clearing wages. Though this assump-
tion proves convenient analytically, it is far from innocuous because it neglects
the interplay between human capital investment and employment prospects. On
the one hand, the incidence and duration of unemployment likely aﬀect skill ac-
cumulation; since human capital lies idle during unemployment periods, worse
employment prospects should be expected to reduce investment incentives. On
the other hand, workers’ debt positions when leaving school may inﬂuence their
attitude towards unemployment risk, their career choice, and their search and
application behavior.
In this paper we study human capital investment in an environment of labor
market imperfections. To minimize deviations from the classical labor market
model and still allow for frictions, we develop a competitive search model in
the tradition of Moen (1997) where ﬁrms post wages and workers direct their
search. In our model, poorer workers intending to acquire skills must raise an
education loan which they cannot repay during unemployment spells. Although
competitive loan premia fully reﬂect the default risk, the debt position takes an
impact on workers’ risk–taking behavior.2 With a limited liability constraint,
1Key references are Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson
(1996).
2Student loan default is a relevant issue, particularly in countries with high tuition fees.
According to a study of the U.S. Department of Education (Choy and Li (2006)), ten percent
of a 1992–1993 cohort of bachelor degree recipients who took out a federal loan had defaulted
at least once in the ten years after graduation. Moreover, defaulted student loans cost the
1workers with a larger debt burden prefer jobs with higher wages and longer job
queues. The labor market in turn provides the risk sought by workers. The
equilibrium allocation is characterized by too much unemployment risk among
poorer workers which ultimately depresses their return to human capital. When
considering their educational options, they anticipate these employment prospects
and underinvest in education. As a result, both the educational attainment and
the ﬁrms’ investment in skill–intensive technology are socially too low.
There are no frictions in the credit market in our model, except our natural as-
sumption that loan contracts cannot be contingent on the (unobservable) search
behavior in the labor market. As a result, and in contrast to the literature
on capital market failure, all workers face the same expected cost of education,
regardless of their wealth endowment. On the other hand, the expected skill pre-
mium is lower for poorer individuals, so that they do not invest as much as their
richer fellows.For rich workers, schooling costs are sunk when they enter the labor
market, so they have no impact on their search behavior. By contrast, poorer stu-
dents who have accumulated debts anticipate that they can default on their loans
during longer unemployment spells, avoid repayment, and reduce their eﬀective
debt burden. Being less reluctant to accept unemployment risk, they direct their
search to riskier and better paid careers. Worse employment prospects, however,
diminish their expected skill premium and depress their inclination to invest in
human capital.
The extent to which people have to raise debts to pay for their education bears
an eﬀect on their labor market behavior and ultimately on their educational
attainment. A public education system where society covers individual schooling
costs can avoid these distortions and restore eﬃciency, provided that subsidies
are ﬁnanced completely by a tax on skilled labor.3 In this sense, we obtain a
justiﬁcation for public subsidization of higher education, even in the absence of
capital market imperfections and human capital externalities. Our mechanism,
moreover, suggests that diﬀerences in education systems can account for cross–
country variations in wage inequality: both within–group and between–group
inequality are larger under private than under public funding. Further, increases
U.S. federal government more than two billion dollars per year during the 1990s (Flint (1997)).
3If public education was ﬁnanced diﬀerently, private education costs would become smaller
than social costs, so that too many workers would opt for education. Therefore, public education
can only implement eﬃciency if it does not redistribute wealth between diﬀerent wealth classes.
2in education costs raise inequality under private education, but not under public
education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of related
literature in the next section, the model is outlined in Section 3, equilibrium in
the labor market is characterized in Section 4, and loan market equilibrium and
schooling decisions are derived in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes eﬃciency, and
Section 7 discusses public policy and wage inequality. Section 8 extends the
ineﬃciency result to an inﬁnite–horizon model, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to a larger literature that studies investment behavior under
search frictions. Some contributions discuss the hold–up problem which occurs
when ﬁrms or workers commit to irreversible investment before they meet in the
labor market. Under such circumstances agents invest too little since their future
trading partners, who beneﬁt from higher investment, cannot be forced to pay an
appropriate share in the sunk investment cost.4 Another source of underinvest-
ment may come from a coordination problem in a random search environment:
every worker beneﬁts from higher education of other workers since a better edu-
cated workforce induces higher investment of ﬁrms who, at the time of investment,
do not know what type of worker they meet (see Acemoglu (1996) and Masters
(1998)). However, recent research shows that the presence of competitive forces
in the labor market can alleviate these problems. An environment of competitive
search where, for example, ﬁrms publicly post wages to attract workers, and un-
employed workers direct their search to the most attractive ﬁrms, can guarantee
eﬃcient levels of investment (see, for example, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b),
Shi (2001), Shi (2002) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005)). Our paper
provides an example showing that underinvestment occurs despite competitive
search, with a mechanism that is very diﬀerent from those of holdup and coordi-
nation problems.
There are a few contributions discussing the interrelation between education in-
4Grout (1984) and Malcomson (1999) discuss the holdup problem in partial worker–ﬁrm
relationships, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) and Acemoglu (2001) examine applications in
search models.
3vestment and labor market search, but search is random in all of them.5 In the
models of Moen (1999) and Charlot and Decreuse (2005), workers may invest too
much in education since they do not internalize the negative externality of their
investment on other workers’ employment chances. Such eﬀects are absent from
our model since wages under competitive search usually balance all congestion
externalities eﬃciently. Burdett and Smith (2002) and Ortigueira (2006) show
that the interaction between endogenous skill formation and labor search can
lead to multiplicity of equilibria, some with a combination of too little education
and high unemployment. In our model, equilibrium is unique and the mechanism
leading to underinvestment does not hinge on complementarities. Closely related
to the continuous–time model in Section 8 of this paper is the model of Moen
(1998) in which limited liability of borrowers can eliminate the holdup problem
and guarantee eﬃcient human capital investment. This result stands in contrast
to ours, but it is based on quite diﬀerent assumptions, in particular an exogenous
number of ﬁrms and wage bargaining, as we discuss below.
Our mechanism is based on a moral hazard problem which is generated exclusively
by search frictions in the labor market. In fact, if the labor market was perfectly
competitive, schooling and investment decisions would be eﬃcient. From this
perspective, our model is closely related to Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) who
also consider a case of market–generated moral hazard. In their model risk–averse
workers aim to reduce unemployment risk and search jobs with too low wages. An
unemployment insurance makes workers more willing to accept employment risk
and ultimately raises capital–labor ratios and wages. Our paper has risk–neutral
workers and does not discuss unemployment insurance; instead the moral hazard
problem emerges in the market for education loans. Upon signing a loan contract,
workers would prefer to commit to a safer search strategy in the labor market.
But since application decisions are private information, the loan contracts cannot
be conditioned on it. Limited liability and the lack of commitment ultimately
induce workers to behave in a risk–loving way. Clearly, our results also remain
intact for moderate degrees of risk–aversion.
5An exception is Moen and Rosen (2004) who consider a competitive search model where
ﬁrms can invest in general human capital of their workers and turnover is necessary for eﬃciency.
Equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient if training ﬁrms and workers can sign long–term contracts.
43 The model
The model has a unit mass of workers, an endogenous large number of ﬁrms and
a large number of competitive banks. All agents are risk neutral. There is a
competitive, frictionless market for education loans, and frictional labor markets
for skilled and unskilled workers, both of which are characterized by competitive
search. There are two periods.6 At t = 0, some workers obtain education loans
from banks, invest in education and become skilled. Workers who do not invest
remain unskilled. At t = 1 ﬁrms create jobs for skilled and unskilled workers,
they are matched with workers and production takes place. Only employed skilled
workers repay their education loans, whilst unemployed skilled workers have zero
income and are unable to repay. Under this limited liability constraint, a loan
contract is fully speciﬁed by the repayment ρ(ℓ) of an employed, skilled worker
at t = 1 who had borrowed ℓ > 0 in period t = 0. Importantly, at what type
of job a worker directs his search cannot be observed by banks, so that loan
contracts cannot be contingent on the search behavior of workers. We normalize
the risk–free interest rate to zero. Perfect competition between risk–neutral banks
ensures that the return on an education loan coincides with the risk–free return.
That is, the principal ℓ must be equal to the repayment ρ(ℓ) multiplied with the
probability that a worker with loan ℓ ﬁnds employment, which will be determined
below.
Workers are heterogenous along two dimensions, ability and wealth, which are
independent.7 To simplify the model, ability takes no direct impact on productiv-
ity, but it determines a non–pecuniary eﬀort cost e ≥ 0 that workers must incur
upon obtaining education. The diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function of e is denoted H. Let x ≥ 0 be the wealth level at the
beginning of t = 0. The pecuniary cost of education (tuition) is the same for all
workers and equal to ℓ0. When a worker with wealth x invests in education, he
needs to borrow ℓ = max(ℓ0 − x,0). There is a ﬁnite number of wealth levels in
the population. Let Λ denote the cumulative distribution function of ℓ ∈ [0,ℓ0]
following from this wealth distribution. To guarantee that some individuals re-
quire external funding to pay for their education and some do not, we assume
that 0 < Λ(0) < 1.
6An inﬁnite–horizon version of our model is presented in Section 8.
7The independence assumption simpliﬁes notation but has no eﬀect on results.
5Workers consume only in the second period, so they are interested in maximizing
their wealth at the end of period 1 net of the eﬀort cost. That is, a worker with
eﬀort level e, wealth x and ℓ = max(ℓ0 − x,0) obtains utility
Us[ρ(ℓ)] + max(x − ℓ0,0) − e , with education, (1)
Uu + x , without education. (2)
Here Us[ρ(ℓ)] is the expected income (wage income net of loan repayment) of a
skilled worker with loan burden ρ(ℓ), and Uu is expected income of an unskilled
worker, both of which are to be determined below.
At t = 1 ﬁrms enter the labor market and create high–skill and low–skill jobs,
both at cost c. A high–skill job can only be ﬁlled with skilled (educated) workers
and produces output ps, whereas low–skill jobs can be ﬁlled with all workers and
produce output pu < ps. Below we will impose an assumption guaranteeing that
Us(ρ(ℓ)) > Uu for all workers, which makes sure that skilled workers do not apply
for low–skill jobs; hence there is no cross–skill matching and markets for skilled
and unskilled labor are completely separated.
Matching in the labor market is modelled in the following way. Firms that in-
curred the entry cost post wages. Having observed all wages, workers decide
where to apply, i.e. they seek jobs with a speciﬁc wage oﬀered by a ﬁrm.8 Work-
ers and ﬁrms correctly anticipate how workers’ application decisions aﬀect their
respective matching probabilities. In particular, every wage is associated with an
expected number of applicants per job q = u/v (“average queue length”), where v
is the number of vacancies posting the same wage and u is the number of workers
applying for jobs promising this wage. Let ϕ(q) be the probability that a ﬁrm
searching in such a submarket is matched with a worker so that λ(q) = ϕ(q)/q is
the probability that a worker in this submarket ﬁnds a job.
Assumption 1 The function ϕ is strictly increasing, strictly concave, diﬀeren-
tiable, and it satisﬁes ϕ(q) ≤ min(1,q), ϕ′(0) = 1, and limq→∞ ϕ(q)−qϕ′(q) = 1.
8The assumption that a worker can direct search to only one wage is clearly restrictive; it
relates to the urn–ball microfoundation of matching functions of Montgomery (1991) and Bur-
dett, Shi, and Wright (2001) where a worker sends one application in a given period. Extending
such a model to multiple applications, Galenianos and Kircher (2007) show that there is wage
dispersion and that workers diversify their application portfolio, and Kircher (2007) considers
a related model where equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. We conjecture, however, that our
ineﬃciency result would carry over to such an environment as well.
6The last two requirements imply that λ(0) = 1 and that ﬁrms capture all surplus
when the number of applicants goes to inﬁnity (Proposition 1 below). Both
are not essential but simplify the exposition. A standard example is the urn–
ball matching process which leads to ϕ(q) = 1 − e−q. Another one is ϕ(q) =
q/(1+q), which has been called additive–matching–rate technology (see Berentsen,
Rocheteau, and Shi (2001)). Matching functions are identical in markets for
skilled and unskilled labor.9
4 Competitive search equilibrium
This section characterizes a competitive search equilibrium at t = 1 for a given
level of education and a distribution of loan contracts. The next section considers
equilibrium in the loan market and describes education decisions at t = 0. Sup-
pose that a mass E of skilled and 1−E unskilled workers enter the labor market
at t = 1. Let F(ρ) be the distribution of required loan repayments that educated
workers carry into the second period, and let R be the ﬁnite support of F.
A competitive search equilibrium, conditional on (E,F), is described by the fol-
lowing objects. Wk ⊂ IR+, k = s,u, are sets of posted wages for high–skill and
low–skill jobs, the functions Qk : IR+ → IR+ ∪{∞}, k = s,u, map wages into
average queue lengths, Uu ∈ R+ is expected income of an unskilled worker, and
Us : R → IR+ maps a loan repayment ρ ∈ R into the expected income of a skilled
worker with loan burden ρ. We follow Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) in deﬁning
a competitive search equilibrium:10
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive search equilibrium, conditional on E educated work-
ers and a distribution F of loan repayments, is a list (Ws,Wu,Qs,Qu,Us,Uu)
satisfying the following properties:
9Relaxing the assumption that entry costs and matching functions are identical in both
segments of the labor market would only complicate notation without changing any results.
10As mentioned before, an assumption below rules out that skilled workers apply for low–
skill jobs; hence this possibility is already precluded in our equilibrium deﬁnition. Further, the
equilibrium deﬁnition does not explicitly state how many ﬁrms enter in what segment of the
labor market and post what wages. These numbers can be traced back from the average queue
lengths and the distribution of ρ, however.
7(a) Firms maximize proﬁts:
ϕ[Qk(w)](pk − w) − c ≤ 0
for all w ≥ 0 and with equality if w ∈ Wk, k = s,u.
(b) Workers’ application decisions are optimal. That is, for all w ≥ 0 and
ρ ∈ R,
Qu(w) ≥ 0 , λ[Qu(w)]w ≤ Uu , (3)
Qs(w) ≥ 0 , max
n
λ[Qs(w)](w − ρ) − Us(ρ)
￿ ￿ ￿ρ ∈ R
o
≤ 0 , (4)
with complementary slackness in (3) and in (4), where
Us(ρ) = sup
w∈Ws




In (a), ﬁrms trade oﬀ a lower wage against a higher probability of ﬁnding a
worker. Expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm in segment k = s,u is maximal when w ∈ Wk,
and free entry drives expected proﬁt to zero. Similarly, in (b), workers trade
oﬀ a higher wage against a lower probability to ﬁnd a job. Optimal application
decisions maximize utility for all types of workers so that (5) and (6) deﬁne
Us(ρ) and Uu. The complementary slackness conditions (3) and (4) deﬁne queue
lengths of all types of workers at arbitrary wages w ≥ 0, also oﬀ the equilibrium.
For example, if an unskilled worker can get the job for sure – thus earning w
for certain – and still not achieve Uu, then unskilled workers do not apply for
such a vacancy and Qu(w) = 0. Otherwise, the queue length adjusts such that
every applicant expects income Uu, i.e. Qu(w) = λ−1[Uu/w]. Similarly, if no
skilled worker type can achieve Us(ρ) getting w − ρ for sure – i.e. if max{w −
ρ − Us(ρ)|ρ ∈ R} < 0 – then Qs(w) = 0. If this condition is violated the
average queue length of skilled workers at a job posting w guarantees that some
types just achieve Us(ρ) while the rest gets less than their maximum utility:
Qs(w) = λ−1 [min{Us(ρ)/(w − ρ)|ρ ∈ R}]. The following proposition shows that
there is a unique competitive search equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Assume that max{ρ ∈ R} < ps − c.
8(a) There exists a unique competitive search equilibrium with the following fea-
tures:
(i) Wu = {wu} where wu and qu = Qu(wu) solve max
w,q
λ(q)w subject to the






pu , wu = pu − c
ϕ(qu) . (7)
Expected income of an unskilled worker is given by Uu ≡ λ(qu)wu.










(ps − ρ) , ws = ps − c
ϕ(qs) . (8)
Expected utility as a function of the repayment obligation ρ is given by
Us(ρ) ≡ λ(qs(ρ))(ws(ρ) − ρ).
(b) The equilibrium wages ws and queue lengths qs are increasing in ρ.
(c) Expected labor income λ(qs)ws and expected income net of loan repayment
Us are declining in the loan burden ρ.
Proof: Appendix.
The ﬁrst part shows that a wage–risk combination is part of an equilibrium if and
only if it maximizes the expected utility of one worker type with a speciﬁc repay-
ment obligation subject to a zero–proﬁt constraint for ﬁrms. In this sense, the
market for skilled labor completely segments into submarkets. This is, of course,
a consequence of ﬁrms competing for workers by posting wages. Graphically, in
Figure 1, the optimum lies at a tangency point between a worker’s indiﬀerence
curve and the zero–proﬁt curve. In particular, workers and ﬁrms have the same
rate of substitution between q and w.11 Limited liability, which requires that
only employed workers need to repay an education loan (formally embodied in
11An equivalent formulation states that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts ϕ(q)(ps−w) subject to workers’
participation constraint λ(q)(w − ρ) = U(ρ), while free entry pins down q(ρ), w(ρ) and U(ρ).
9the deﬁnition of expected utility (5)), implies that workers with a larger loan
burden take higher risks and apply for those jobs that are harder to get. Firms,
in turn, recognize the demand for risk and oﬀer those high–wage jobs with a
larger number of applicants.12 Equations (7) and (8) determine the number of
ﬁrms in every market segment; the ﬁrst equation says that ﬁrms make zero ex-
pected proﬁt (note that a ﬁrm receives a fraction 1 − ϕ′(q)q/ϕ(q) of job surplus
ps − ρ, pu respectively). The second equation solves the free–entry condition at
the corresponding wage.
Figure 1: Equilibrium wages and queue lengths for skilled workers. A higher loan
burden shifts ws and qs upwards.
Part (c) says that a worker with higher debt earns lower wage income on average,
although such a worker applies for jobs with higher wages. Expected income net
of loan repayment is also declining in the size of the loan. In particular, workers
who can pay education out of their own wealth earn highest expected income.
12This segmentation cannot occur in a model of random search where wages are the outcome
of a bargain after workers and ﬁrms meet. In such a model, an increase in ρ raises bargained
wages and reduces ﬁrm entry which harms employment chances for all workers.
105 The loan market and education investment
A large number of risk–neutral banks compete by oﬀering loan contracts speci-
fying for any loan size ℓ the repayment in the event of employment, ρ(ℓ). For
which job a worker applies cannot be observed and thus cannot be speciﬁed in
the loan contract. However, banks correctly anticipate how the size of the loan
aﬀects workers’ application behavior. Perfect competition implies that the return
on education loans equals the risk–free rate, which is zero, so any equilibrium loan
contract must satisfy that λ[qs(ρ(ℓ))]ρ(ℓ) = ℓ. Because there may be several loan
contracts satisfying this requirement, only the one that maximizes worker utility







￿ λ[qs(ρ)]ρ = ℓ
o
. (9)
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium loan contract for a given loan size ℓ. The bounded
curve is the relation between ρ and qs(ρ) as speciﬁed in Proposition 1. Workers
without a loan can expect queue length q0
s ≡ qs(0), and when ρ → ps − c, the
average queue length goes to inﬁnity, which follows from (8) and Assumption 1.
The other curve in the ﬁgure is the zero–return relation ρ = ℓ/λ(q). When the
average queue length is zero, an applicant gets the job for sure (Assumption 1),
so that ρ = ℓ if q = 0. When q tends to inﬁnity λ goes to zero, and ρ tends to
inﬁnity. These considerations suggest that there is generically an even number of
intersections between these curves. Furthermore, at least one intersection exists
provided that ℓ is not too large. When ℓ is low enough, the curve ℓ/λ(q) becomes
arbitrarily small for all values of q close to q0
s, so that an intersection with the
curve qs = qs(ρ) must exist.
Let ℓ be the maximum loan size for which there is an intersection between these
two curves. Then, for every loan size ℓ ≤ ℓ, banks oﬀer a loan contract ρ(ℓ) which
corresponds to the lowest intersection point between the two curves because this
is the one where worker utility is largest (Proposition 1 (c)).Figure 2 shows that
ρ(ℓ) is increasing in ℓ. We assume that even the poorest workers can ﬁnd a bank
oﬀering an education loan, so there is no credit rationing:





qs qs( ( )) ρ ℓ
qs( ) ρ
r l = / ℓ ( ) qs
qs
Figure 2: Equilibrium in the loan market.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every worker with ℓ ∈ (0,ℓ0] ﬁnds
a bank oﬀering a loan contract ρ(ℓ) ≥ ℓ. The repayment obligation ρ is increasing
in ℓ and satisﬁes limℓ→0 ρ(ℓ) = 0.
Now consider the education decision. To simplify notation, let
Is(ℓ) ≡ λ[qs(ρ(ℓ))]ws(ρ(ℓ))
be expected labor income of a skilled worker with education loan ℓ. Propositions
1 and 2 imply that Is is declining in ℓ. Inserting ρ(ℓ) = ℓ/λ[qs(ρ(ℓ))] into Us(ρ(ℓ))
shows that expected income of a skilled worker with loan size ℓ is
Us(ρ(ℓ)) = Is(ℓ) − ℓ .
An unskilled worker’s expected income is equal to
Uu = λ(qu)wu .
12A worker with eﬀort level e and loan size ℓ = max{ℓ0 − x,0} decides to invest in
education if, and only if, utility with education (1) is at least as large as utility
without education (2). This condition is equivalent to the requirement that
e + ℓ0 ≤ Is(ℓ) − Uu , (10)
which says that the cost of education (eﬀort and tuition) on the left–hand side is
no larger than the expected skill premium on the right–hand side. Importantly,
expected education costs do not depend on the level of wealth x: there are no fric-
tions in the loan market (besides our natural assumption that job search behavior
is unobservable to creditors), no agent is rationed and all borrowers pay the same
(zero) rate of return. Hence the expected (pecuniary) cost of education is equal
to ℓ0 for all workers; since neither banks nor ﬁrms make proﬁts in equilibrium,
workers must, on average, bear the cost of education. However, wealth aﬀects
the size of the education loan and so, via labor market search, the expected skill
premium on the right–hand side. Indeed, the expected skill premium is increasing
in the level of wealth. Poorer workers with a larger debt burden take higher risks,
achieving a lower income in expectation.
Because Is is falling in ℓ, there is a declining curve in (e,ℓ)–space, separating
investors from noninvestors, as shown in Figure 3. Clearly, individuals with
higher ability (who have lower e) or who are richer (a lower ℓ) are those who
invest in education. We assume that the poorest workers invest in education,
provided they are clever enough:
Assumption 3 Is(ℓ0) − Uu > ℓ0.
The assumption implies that there are critical eﬀort levels 0 < e < e such that
all workers with e ≤ e invest and no worker with e > e invests. Assumption 3
also implies that expected income of the poorest skilled worker is strictly larger
than expected income of an unskilled worker, i.e. Us(ρ(ℓ0)) = Is(ℓ0) − ℓ0 > Uu.
In particular, all skilled workers obtain strictly higher utility when applying for
a high–skill job rather than applying for a low–skill job. This justiﬁes the im-
plicit simplifying assumption underlying the deﬁnition of a competitive search
equilibrium in Section 3.
From (10) and e ∼ H, the number of educated persons with loan size ℓ is









Figure 3: The sets of investing and non–investing individuals are separated by
the line Ae.




H[Is(ℓ) − Uu − ℓ0] dΛ(ℓ)
workers invest in education. The numbers of low–skill and high–skill jobs are




H[Is(ℓ) − Uu − ℓ0]
qs(ρ(ℓ)) dΛ(ℓ) .
6 Ineﬃciency
Consider a central planner who cannot overcome search frictions but who can
dictate which workers obtain education and how many ﬁrms enter what segment
of the labor market. Clearly, the planner does not care about the distribution
of wealth. He simply decides a cutoﬀ level of eﬀort eP (so that all workers with
e ≤ eP invest) and the number of ﬁrms in the two segments which are H(eP)/qP
s
14and (1−H(eP))/qP
u , where qP
s and qP
u are the corresponding queue lengths. The
planner is interested in maximizing aggregate surplus which is total output net














Maximization with respect to e, qs and qu yields the following result.
Proposition 4 Let (qs(.),qu,E,Js,Ju) be the competitive equilibrium of Propo-




u ) be the social optimum. Then,
(a) qP
u = qu, qP
s = qs(0) < qs(ρ) for all ρ > 0.
(b) there is too little investment in education, E < EP = H(eP), the number of
high–skill jobs is too low, Js < JP
s , and the number of low–skill jobs is too
high, Ju > JP
u .
Proof: Appendix.
Part (a) of the proposition compares the socially optimal queue lengths with those
in the competitive equilibrium. In the market for unskilled labor, competitive
search produces the right queue length, i.e. entry is eﬃcient conditional on the
number of unskilled workers. This result is little surprising and simply establishes
the ﬁnding of Moen (1997) that competitive search leads to eﬃcient ﬁrm entry.
However, queue lengths in submarkets for skilled workers with education loans are
too long. This ineﬃciency reﬂects the moral hazard problem that is generated
by search frictions. Banks oﬀer contracts which take into account the default
risk but which cannot commit workers to a certain search strategy in the labor
market. To reduce default, banks would like to induce workers to seek jobs with
lower wages and shorter job queues. Workers, however, can evade repayment
during unemployment, so they prefer to search for high–wage jobs with longer
queues. In equilibrium, thus, job queues are too long and default is too high.
Part (b) compares socially optimal investment with investment in the compet-
itive equilibrium. There is too little investment in education and too little
investment in high–skill technology. In fact, those workers with ℓ > 0 and
e ∈ (Is(ℓ) − Uu − ℓ0,e] (the triangle ABe in Figure 3) do not invest although
15it would be socially beneﬁcial if they did. Lastly, since market tightness is eﬃ-
cient in the unskilled sector, there are too many low–skill jobs together with too
many unskilled workers.
To understand why there is too little investment in education, observe ﬁrst that
the expected cost of education is the same for all workers, regardless of their
initial wealth. Therefore the private cost of education coincides with the social
cost. In this respect, our ineﬃciency is quite diﬀerent from alternative stories
explaining insuﬃcient investment by imperfections in the capital market which
make borrowing for poor individuals too expensive (or even impossible). The
reason why fewer poor individuals invest in our model is precisely that their
average queue lengths are too high which ultimately leads to a skill premium
which is too low relative to the output gain for society. Put diﬀerently, utilization
of human capital is too low for poorer individuals.
It is also important to emphasize that the underinvestment result is quite dif-
ferent from the usual holdup eﬀect which says that workers invest too little in
education because ﬁrms gain part of the return while only workers bear the cost.
Here, again, workers bear the education cost alone, but ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from
education. Instead, they oﬀer higher wages, and because they do, there is too
little entry which ultimately depresses the private return to education.
The negative dependence of the skill premium on ℓ would disappear if workers
could commit to a search behavior in the labor market at the time when the loan
contract is signed. In this sense, moral hazard and the lack of commitment are at
the heart of the problem. Firms service workers’ preferences by providing high–
wage jobs associated with higher unemployment risk. Our model is therefore
characterized by market–generated moral hazard: if the labor market did not
supply the corresponding wage/risk combinations, workers could not apply for
these jobs.
A similar problem of market–generated moral hazard is studied in Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999a). They consider a model with risk–averse workers who do not
diﬀer in their skill level and wish to insure against labor market risk. Firms sup-
ply low–wage/low–unemployment jobs, and the labor market displays ineﬃciently
low risk–taking together with insuﬃcient investment. Acemoglu and Shimer show
that a moderate unemployment insurance increases workers’ willingness to accept
risk which raises investment and output. Introducing risk aversion in our model
16would reduce the equilibrium amount of uncertainty, thus counteracting the eﬀect
described above. In fact, it can be shown that any concave transformation of the
utility function leads to lower q and lower w.13 Whether the model produces more
or less than the output–maximizing amount of risk cannot be decided in general.
For a moderate degree of risk aversion, however, the limited liability eﬀect would
dominate, so that there is too much risk–taking and too little investment in ed-
ucation in the aggregate. When risk aversion increases, employment uncertainty
declines and investment goes up.
7 Public policy and wage inequality
What can policy do to restore eﬃciency? One possibility implementing the eﬃ-
cient allocation is a public education system which is ﬁnanced by a tax on skilled
labor (a “graduate tax”). Suppose the government pays the education cost ℓ0
for every worker who wants to become educated, which is ﬁnanced by a tax t
on the wage income of skilled workers. Such a proportional tax on skilled labor
does not distort the competitive search equilibrium. Indeed, expected utility of
a skilled worker searching a job (w,q) is λ(q)w(1 − t), and maximization of this
expression subject to the zero–proﬁt constraint c = ϕ(q)(ps − w) is independent
of t, implementing the eﬃcient queue length qP
s = qs(0) together with the skilled
wage wP
s ≡ ps − c/qP
s . The speciﬁcation that only skilled workers pay for educa-
tion also guarantees that education decisions are eﬃcient. Intuitively, with public
education private (pecuniary) education costs are zero while the social education
costs are still at ℓ0. To make sure that not too many workers invest, the expected
skill premium must be reduced by exactly ℓ0. Formally, the government budget
is balanced if the expected tax revenue of every skilled worker is equal to the





s = ℓ0 .
But precisely this condition makes sure that all workers with e ≤ e = eP, and
only those, invest in education. In fact, a worker opts for education whenever the
13A formal proof is based on an application of a revealed preference argument as in Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999a).





s (1 − t) − Uu = Us(0) − ℓ0 − U0 = e
P .
These considerations also show that public education can only implement an
eﬃcient allocation if it is completely ﬁnanced by a tax on skilled labor. Any
other way of ﬁnancing public education, for example by partly taxing wealth or
unskilled labor, would lead to overeducation: the skill premium would become
larger than the education cost of the eﬃcient marginal worker.
Proposition 5 Public education ﬁnanced with a proportional graduate tax im-
plements the eﬃcient outcome. Any form of ﬁnancing where unskilled workers
pay some share of public education leads to overeducation.
Since a graduate tax works similarly as a progressive income tax, our result
relates to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) who argue that progressive taxation and
education subsidies are Siamese twins. If the government taxes skilled labor to
redistribute income towards the less able, subsidies should be introduced to keep
human capital at an eﬃcient level. Our argument goes the other way round.
Debt ﬁnanced education leads to an ineﬃciently low level of human capital, and
subsidies help avoiding these distortions. A tax on skilled labor must then be
used to limit investment activity.
Another policy implementing the same eﬃcient outcome would be a more ﬂexible
graduate tax system in which the government pays any required level of educa-
tion expenses ℓ = max{ℓ0 −x,0}, and skilled workers pay a tax on labor income,
where the individual tax rate tℓ depends on ℓ. Again, the budget is balanced
and education investment is eﬃcient if the government subsidy is exactly oﬀset
by the expected tax payment, ℓ = tℓλ(qP
s )wP
s , so that the expected pecuniary
cost of education is ℓ0 for all workers. Put diﬀerently, the policy will only imple-
ment an eﬃcient allocation if it is free from any redistribution between diﬀerent
wealth classes. Again, this contrasts with models of capital market failure, which
typically suggest a redistribution of wealth from richer to poorer households as a
means to raise welfare.14
14Instead of paying for education directly, the government might subsidize private loans by
guaranteeing repayment in case of unemployment. While such a measure would reduce the
risk premium – loans are paid back regardless of the employment status – and the repayment
obligation, search/application behavior would still be distorted: agents have an incentive to
choose too much risk because some of the debt costs are now borne by society.
18Economies with public and private education regimes not only diﬀer in their
relative supply of skills, they also diﬀer in wage inequality, both between groups
and within groups. In a simple supply–demand framework, a larger relative
supply of skilled labor tends to depress the skill premium. However, such an
eﬀect is absent in our model, where the marginal product of skilled and unskilled
labor is constant and where, as in other search models, free entry ensures that
any change in the supply of labor raises the number of jobs proportionately with
no eﬀect on wages. Nevertheless, private education has larger wage inequality
than public education, even in the absence of a diﬀerence in the supply of skills.
Under public education, all skilled workers earn the same wage ws(0); hence there
is no within–group wage inequality, and the measured skill premium is simply
ws(0) − wu.15 Under private education, only some workers earn ws(0), but there
are others who earn higher wages ws(ρ) > ws(0). Hence, within–group wage
inequality is positive, and the measured skill premium, which is the diﬀerence
between the average of ws(ρ) across all employed, skilled worker and wu, is larger
than ws(0) − wu. This shows
Proposition 6 An economy with private education has larger within–group wage
inequality and a larger skill premium than an identical economy with public edu-
cation.
One may wonder whether our model can qualitatively account for the diverging
trends in wage inequality between the USA and several European countries during
the last decades. Many contributions explaining this phenomenon argue that
Europe’s rigid labor markets prevented wage inequality from rising as much as in
the USA, or have contributed to less skill–biased technical change in Europe (see
for example Acemoglu (2003)). Our model can deliver an alternative story which
is based on diﬀerences in education ﬁnance, instead of diﬀerences in labor market
institutions. To abstract from changes in the relative supply of skills, suppose
that there are only two ability levels and two wealth classes: some agents have
e = 0 and always educate while others have very high e and never educate.
On the other hand, some have high wealth and do not need to borrow, while
others have no wealth and need to borrow ℓ0 to obtain education. In this setting,
15The way how public education is ﬁnanced takes no impact on wages, as long as taxes on
labor income are proportional.
19moderate changes in education costs take no impact on skill supply. They also
take no impact on wage inequality under public educations, but they alter the skill
premium and within–group wage inequality under private education. Although
deﬁnite results are hard to derive analytically, all our numerical experiments show
that both inequality measures are increasing in ℓ0.16 Hence, a noticeable increase
in tuition (as it occurred in the USA during the last decades) can trigger a rise
in wage inequality in a private education regime. Under public education, in
contrast, an increase in ℓ0 together with an increase of (proportional) taxes has
no eﬀect on wage inequality.
8 An inﬁnite–horizon model
The previous discussion has focused on a two–period setting where every individ-
ual can be in only two states in the second period; either the worker ﬁnds a job
and honors his obligations, or he is unemployed and defaults. The presence of
limited liability leads to a preference for risk among borrowers which ultimately
depresses human capital investments. A similar mechanism is at work in a multi–
period model, provided that the length of unemployment spells takes an impact
on the eﬀective debt burden. Then again, agents with a larger debt search for
better–paid jobs at the expense of longer–lasting unemployment. We illustrate
this assertion with a simple inﬁnite–horizon model where debtors, whilst being
unemployed, are able to defer repayment and to reduce the eﬀective debt bur-
den.17 Indeed, it is common practice in some countries to provide students with
subsidized loans which do not accumulate interest when payments are deferred
during unemployment spells (e.g. Federal Staﬀord Loans in the USA). To give an-
other example, many German banks require a mandatory residual debt insurance
(covering the risk of unemployment, among others) upon granting an education
16When ℓ0 goes up, ρ(ℓ) is increasing, and so are wages ws(ρ(ℓ)). However, since qs(ρ(ℓ))
is falling, fewer workers earn high wages, so that the net eﬀect on the mean skilled wage and
on residual inequality is generally ambiguous. However, all our numerical experiments with an
urn–ball matching function showed that these inequality measures are globally increasing in ℓ0.
17More generally, “unemployment” need not literally refer to a situation where a person is
not working. In many loan arrangements, debt can be deferred when income is low which may
also result from a low–skill employment status. Indeed, our mechanism should work equally in
an alternative setting with a competitive low–skill labor market where every educated worker
can ﬁnd employment.
20loan. Further, the possibility of consumer bankruptcy also facilitates default as
a potential consequence of unemployment.
The model is set in continuous time. During every unit time interval a cohort of
size δ is born, and all individuals face a ﬂow probability δ of death (or permanent
labor market exit), so that the size of the working population stays constant at
one. Upon birth, agents decide whether to invest in education which costs eﬀort
e and a ﬁxed investment of resources ℓ0. As before, e has distribution function H
in every cohort, but now all agents start life with zero wealth; hence every agent
opting for education must take an education loan of size ℓ0. Education is not time–
consuming and happens instantaneously. After the education decision, workers
search for jobs and start producing once they are matched with ﬁrms. The ﬂow
probabilities with which ﬁrms encounter workers and workers meet ﬁrms, ϕ and
λ, are derived from a constant–returns, concave matching technology satisfying
the Inada conditions. To simplify things, we abstain from job destruction, so job
separations occur only if the worker exits the labor market. In this event the
vacancy becomes worthless.
To further simplify, we follow Moen (1998) and consider only annuity contracts
specifying a constant ﬂow repayment which is independent of the individual re-
payment history.18 The repayment may however depend on the employment
status of workers; hence any contract speciﬁes ﬂow repayment during employ-
ment and unemployment, ρE and ρU. A contingent contract has zero repayment
during unemployment, ρU = 0. With such a contract, the eﬀective debt burden
is declining in the length of the unemployment spell, a feature which is embodied
in many education loan arrangements, as mentioned above. As in the static case,
contingent loans generate incentives to search for high–wage jobs, thus accepting
longer unemployment on average. In contrast, an uncontingent contract speci-
ﬁes a repayment which does not depend of the employment status, ρE = ρU.
Here, the eﬀective debt burden is independent of the duration of unemployment.
In both scenarios, the banking sector is perfectly competitive. Loan repayment
ﬂows are determined so that the expected discounted value of the payment stream
equals the loan size ℓ0. This is equivalent to the requirement that a loan con-
tract promises the same expected return as risk–free investment, whose return is
18A more realistic setup where workers repay the exact principal plus accumulated interest
complicates the model considerably since one would need to keep track of the distribution of
debt across diﬀerent cohorts.
21denoted r.
At every instant, ﬁrms create high–skill and low–skill jobs and start looking for
a suitable worker. Job creation costs ﬁxed investment c which must be incurred
upfront. Free entry ensures that the discounted value of expected proﬁts of a
vacancy equals c. We proceed to characterize the labor market equilibrium for a
given loan contract (ρU,ρE).
The asset values of unemployed and employed skilled persons satisfy the Bellman
equations
rUs = −ρ
U + λ(qs)(Es − Us) − δUs ,
rEs = −ρ
E + ws − δEs .
Combining yields
Us =
−ρU(r + δ) + λ(qs)[ws − ρE]
(r + δ)[r + δ + λ(qs)]
.
Similarly the asset values of ﬁlled and vacant high–skill jobs satisfy
rFs = ps − ws − δFs ,




(r + δ)(r + ϕ(qs))
.
We need to determine the equilibrium values of ws and qs. Applying a similar
notion of competitive search equilibrium as in the two–period version, the equi-
librium maximizes workers’ utility subject to a zero–proﬁt condition for ﬁrms (cf.
Proposition 1 and Moen (1997)). The skilled wage ws and the queue length qs
are therefore chosen to maximize Us s.t. Vs = c. Inserting ws from this constraint
into Us and using ϕ(qs) = λ(qs)qs allows us to write this problem as
max
qs
λ(qs)ps − (r + δ)[r/qs + λ(qs)]c − ρU(r + δ) − λ(qs)ρE
(r + δ)[r + δ + λ(qs)]
. (12)
Note at this point that for ρE = ρU the solution to this problem does not depend
on ρE. In particular, Us can then be written as
Us =
λ(qs)ps − (r + δ)(r/qs + λ(qs))c





22so that qs simply maximizes the ﬁrst term in this expression.
In the general case which admits ρE  = ρU, a necessary and suﬃcient condition






U) − (r + δ)c
￿
= rc[r + δ + ϕ
′(qs)] . (14)
While the right–hand side of (14) is strictly decreasing in qs, the left–hand side is
strictly increasing. Because of the Inada conditions for ϕ, there exists a unique
solution qM
s . It is obvious that qM
s is independent of ρE for ρE = ρU and strictly
increasing in ρE − ρU > 0.
Perfect bank competition guarantees that the present discount value of loan re-
payment is equal to the loan size ℓ0. Let AE (AU) denote the asset value of debt











Since every newly educated workers is unemployed, perfect competition between
banks implies that AU equals ℓ0. Using (15) yields the following relation between
ρE and ρU:
ρ
U(r + δ) + λρ
E = (r + δ + λ)(r + δ)ℓ0 . (16)
For an uncontingent loan we obtain ρE = ρU = (r + δ)ℓ0, i.e. the annuity is
discounted with the sum of the risk–free rate and the exit rate. With a contingent
loan (ρU = 0), the repayment rate for the employed is
ρ
E =
(r + δ)(r + δ + λ)
λ
ℓ0 > (r + δ)ℓ0 .








s )ps − (r + δ)(r/qM
s + λ(qM
s ))c
(r + δ)[r + δ + λ(qM
s )]
− ℓ0. (17)
Comparison of (13) and (17) shows that U∗
s is maximal when ρE − ρU = 0. For
any ρE  = ρU, U∗
s is smaller since qM
s maximizes the expression (12), but not (13).
Consequently, U∗
s(0) > U∗
s(ρE − ρU > 0).





u )pu − (r + δ)(r/qM
u + λ(qM
u ))c














[pu − (r + δ)c] = rc
￿






Since unskilled workers do not require credit, their submarket equilibrium is in-
dependent of the loan market.
Under the assumption that there are skilled and unskilled workers in every cohort,







As (10) in the static model, this condition equates the expected education cost
e + ℓ0 to the expected skill premium, which is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst
term in (17) (human wealth of a skilled person) and U∗
u. The observation that
U∗
s(0) > U∗
s(ρE −ρU > 0) implies that uncontingent loans lead to more schooling:
Proposition 7 An economy with contingent loan contracts has less investment
in human capital than an economy with uncontingent loan contracts.
We wish to compare the competitive search equilibrium to the allocation that a
planner would choose who can dictate education and job creation. The planner’s
objective is to maximize the discounted value of output net of the costs of educa-
tion and vacancy creation. He picks the number of skilled and unskilled vacancies
that are created at every instant, as and au, as well as the investment threshold














The numbers of employed and unemployed workers (Nk and uk for k = s,u) and
24the numbers of vacancies (vk for k = s,u) evolve according to
˙ Ns = usλ(qs) − δNs ,
˙ Nu = uuλ(qu) − δNu ,
˙ us = H(e)δ − δus − usλ(qs) ,
˙ uu = [1 − H(e)]δ − δuu − uuλ(qu) ,
˙ vs = as − usλ(qs) ,
˙ vu = au − uuλ(qu) .
We ﬁnd that decentralized equilibria with uncontingent loans are optimal, i.e.
they maximize the discounted value of output net of education and investment
costs.
Proposition 8 The competitive search equilibrium with uncontingent loan con-
tracts is equivalent to the social planner’s solution.
Propositions 7 and 8 together show that contingent debt contracts lead to un-
derinvestment in human capital. Given that unemployment reduces the expected
repayment stream, workers have a preference for better–paid but riskier jobs. An-
ticipating this labor market outcome and the worse utilization of human capital,
fewer people invest in education. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the result
of Moen (1998) who shows that, in a wage–bargaining framework with an ex-
ogenous number of ﬁrms, such contingent debt contracts can remove the holdup
problem since workers can pass on a share of their education expenses to ﬁrms:
if interest payments do not accrue in case of unemployment, they become part of
the match surplus. However, adding a free entry condition to Moen’s framework
would destroy this result and would lead to similar conclusions as in our paper;
higher wage demands of workers with contingent debt contracts reduce ﬁrm en-
try, which in turn worsens employment prospects and ultimately the incentives
to invest in education.
9 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that the amount of debt which an agent needs to ﬁnance
his education, has a an inﬂuence on his labor market prospects. When applying
25for jobs, skilled workers take into account that labor market failure may lead to
delayed repayments or even default which both reduce the eﬀective debt burden.
A ceteris paribus increase in the amount of debt raised can therefore be expected
to aﬀect both risk–bearing and observed wages. This has two interesting impli-
cations. First, the size of the loan and the repayment schedule associated with
it inﬂuence expected as well as observed wages. Hence, the distribution of loan
size among the population has a determining eﬀect on the distribution of skilled
wages and thus on residual inequality. This distribution in turn depends on the
observed wealth distribution, since wealthier students require less external ﬁnance
and loans. More wealth inequality translates into more wage inequality. On the
other hand, the way in which education costs are shared between the government
and individual families matters. If the public plays a more important role in
ﬁnancing higher education, fewer and smaller loans are required which reduces
the variance of skilled wages. By contrast, a largely private education sector is
likely associated with more wage dispersion.
Second, if government subsidies do not keep pace with growing education costs,
poorer individuals require more external assistance to cover higher tuition fees or
increased living costs. Our analysis predicts that this will lead to more risk expo-
sure and higher wages. A large diﬀerence in the growth rates of schooling costs
and student ﬁnancial aid should then translate into an increased skill premium.
This ﬁnding might explain why the widening of the wage gap by skills during the
last two decades was much more pronounced in the US, where students bear a
much larger share of increasing college prices, than in some European countries
where the state plays a more active role in ﬁnancing education.
Apart from covering education expenditures directly, some countries provide stu-
dents with subsidized loans which enable the debtor to defer payments during
unemployment spells without accumulating interest. Our model shows that this
kind of “contingent debt contract” which allows to reduce the eﬀective debt bur-
den during unemployment periods likely provokes more risk–taking and less em-
ployment which in turn has a negative eﬀect on the utilization of human capital
and investment incentives.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) Our assumption that skilled (unskilled) workers choose high–skill (low–skill)
jobs allows us to solve both market segments separately. In what follows, we will
prove existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium list (Ws,Qs,Us) for the skilled
market. The corresponding analysis for unskilled workers is analogous and thus
omitted.
Existence: For every worker type ρ ∈ R, let ws(ρ) > 0 and 0 < qs(ρ) < 1
be the unique solution of maxw,q λ(q)(w − ρ) s.t. the constraint ϕ(q)(ps − w) =
c, i.e. the pair (ws(ρ),qs(ρ)) is given implicitly by (8). We show that there is
an equilibrium where Ws = {ws(ρ)|ρ ∈ R}, Us(ρ) is the maximum attainable
utility given ﬁrms expect zero proﬁts, and for any nonnegative wage Qs(w) = 0
if max{w − ρ − Us(ρ)|ρ ∈ R} < 0 and Qs(w) ≡ λ−1 [min{Us(ρ)/(w − ρ)|ρ ∈ R}]
otherwise.
For agents to maximize their utility, it must be the case that Qs(ws(ˆ ρ)) = qs(ˆ ρ)
for every ˆ ρ ∈ R. It is suﬃcient to prove that min{Us(ρ)/(w(ˆ ρ) − ρ)|ρ ∈ R} =
Us(ˆ ρ)/(w(ˆ ρ)−ˆ ρ). Suppose this is not true, and Us(ˆ ρ)/(ws(ˆ ρ)−ˆ ρ) > Us(˜ ρ)/(ws(ˆ ρ)−
˜ ρ) for some ˜ ρ  = ˆ ρ. Then, the matching probability λ being decreasing in q ensures
29Qs(ws(ˆ ρ)) > qs(ˆ ρ). Since (ws(ˆ ρ),qs(ˆ ρ)) implies zero expected proﬁts for ﬁrms,
ϕ[Qs(ws(ˆ ρ))](ps−ws(ˆ ρ))−c must be positive which is not compatible with proﬁt
maximization (Deﬁnition 1 (a)).
While our construction of Qs guarantees that the list (Ws,Qs,Us) satisﬁes optimal
application (Deﬁnition 1 (b)), we still need to show that proﬁt maximization
holds. Suppose there is a wage ˜ w with the corresponding queue length ˜ q ≡ Qs( ˜ w)
for which ϕ(˜ q)(ps − ˜ w) − c > 0. Since ˜ q must be positive, there exists a worker
type ˜ ρ with
Us(˜ ρ) = λ(qs(˜ ρ))(ws(˜ ρ) − ˜ ρ) = λ(˜ q)( ˜ w − ˜ ρ)
Choose ˆ q < ˜ q such that ϕ(ˆ q)(ps − ˜ w) − c = 0. Since a shorter queue length
increases worker utility,
λ(ˆ q)( ˜ w − ˜ ρ) > Us(˜ ρ)
which contradicts the fact that (ws(˜ ρ),qs(˜ ρ)) solves the constrained optimization
problem of a ˜ ρ–worker.
Uniqueness: Under max{ρ ∈ R} < ps − c, there exists no equilibrium with
Ws = ∅. Otherwise, a ﬁrm could enter, oﬀer a positive wage, attract an inﬁnite
queue and make positive proﬁts.
Assume now that Ws  = ∅. We ﬁrst show that any equilibrium set Ws must
be a subset of {ws(ρ)|ρ ∈ R}. Suppose ˆ w is an equilibrium wage but ˆ w  ∈
{ws(ρ)|ρ ∈ R}. Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms requires ˆ q ≡ Qs( ˆ w) > 0 and
ϕ(ˆ q)(ps − ˆ w) − c = 0. The equilibrium queue length being positive guarantees
that, for one worker type, say ˆ ρ, λ(ˆ q)( ˆ w − ˆ ρ) = Us(ˆ ρ). It is easy to see that
(ˆ w, ˆ q) must equal (ws(ˆ ρ),qs(ˆ ρ)). Suppose ( ˆ w, ˆ q) is not the unique solution of
maxw,q λ(q)(w− ˆ ρ) s.t. ﬁrms making zero proﬁts: ϕ(q)(ps−w)−c = 0. Then the
pair (ws(ˆ ρ),qs(ˆ ρ)) leads to higher worker utility, say ˆ Us, and ﬁrms still expect zero
proﬁts. Because of ws(ˆ ρ) − ˆ ρ > ˆ Us > Us(ˆ ρ), Qs[ws(ˆ ρ)] must be strictly positive
and greater than qs(ˆ ρ). If (ws(ˆ ρ),qs(ˆ ρ)) satisﬁes the ﬁrms’ zero–proﬁt constraint
however, it must be the case that
0 = ϕ(qs(ˆ ρ))(ps − ws(ˆ ρ)) − c < ϕ[Qs(ws(ˆ ρ))](ps − ws(ˆ ρ)) − c
which contradicts proﬁt maximization.
30Finally, we prove that an equilibrium set Ws cannot be a strict subset of {ws(ρ)|ρ ∈
R}. If this was the case, ws(ˆ ρ)  ∈ Ws for some ˆ ρ ∈ R. Since expected ﬁrm prof-
its are zero for any pair (w,Qs(w)) where w is an equilibrium wage, it follows
that Us(ˆ ρ), the maximum utility that a ˆ ρ–type can achieve given Ws and Qs, is
strictly less than the utility generated by the pair (ws(ˆ ρ),qs(ˆ ρ)). Then however
the equilibrium queue length for ﬁrms posting ws(ˆ ρ), Qs(ws(ˆ ρ)), must strictly
exceed qs(ˆ ρ). This once again contradicts proﬁt maximization because longer
queues are proﬁtable for ﬁrms:
0 = ϕ(qs(ˆ ρ))(ps − ws(ˆ ρ)) − c < ϕ[Q(ws(ˆ ρ))](ps − ws(ˆ ρ)) − c.
(b) Follows immediately from (8) and Assumption 1.
(c) To show that expected labor income is falling in ρ, diﬀerentiate λ(qs)ws =
ϕ(qs)ps/qs − c/qs with respect to qs to obtain
[(ϕ







Equation (8) ensures that the term in square brackets equals (ϕ′(qs)qs − ϕ(qs))ρ
which is negative for a strictly concave function ϕ. Since, according to part (b),
∂qs/∂ρ > 0, the result follows.
The envelope theorem guarantees ∂Us/∂ρ = −λ(qs) < 0 and thus a negative
relationship between Us and ρ. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
(a) Maximizing (11) with respect to e, qs and qu yields the ﬁrst–order conditions


















= 0 . (20)
Because of −qλ′(q) = ϕ(q) − qϕ′(q), (20) coincides with the ﬁrst equation in (7)
and (19) coincides with the ﬁrst equation in (8) for ρ = 0. Hence, qP
u = qu and
qP
s = qs(0). Because of Us(0) = λ(qs(0))ps − c/qs(0) and Uu = λ(qu)pu − c/qu,
equation (18) implies eP = Us(0) − Uu − ℓ0 = e.
(b) Since H[Is(ℓ) − Uu − ℓ0] is declining in ℓ (Propositions 1 and 2 imply that
Is is declining, and H is assumed increasing) and since Λ(0) < 1, the number
31of educated workers in the social optimum EP = H(eP) is strictly larger than




















H[Is(ℓ) − Uu − ℓ0]
qs(ρ(ℓ)) dΛ(ℓ) = Js ,
and JP
u = (1 − H(eP))/qP
u = (1 − H(eP))/qu < (1 − E)/qu = Ju. 2
Proof of Proposition 8:
To solve the planner’s problem we set up the current–value Hamiltonian






+ s [usλ(qs) − δNs] +  u [uuλ(qu) − δNu]
+αs [H(e)δ − δus − usλ(qs)] + αu [[1 − H(e)]δ − δuu − uuλ(qu)]
+γs [as − usλ(qs)] + γu [au − uuλ(qu)]
where the  k, αk and γk denote the costate variables corresponding to Nk, uk and
vk with k = s,n.
























= rαs ⇒ (r + δ)αs = ϕ
′(qs)( s − γs − αs) (23)
∂H
∂uu
= rαu ⇒ (r + δ)αu = ϕ
′(qu)( u − γu − αu) (24)
∂H
∂vs
= rγs ⇒ rγs = [ϕ(qs) − qsϕ
′(qs)]( s − αs − γs) (25)
∂H
∂vu
= rγu ⇒ rγu = [ϕ(qu) − quϕ
′(qu)]( u − αu − γu). (26)
Since H is linear in ak (k = s,n) and concave in e, the ﬁrst–order conditions




= 0 ⇒ γs = c (27)
∂H
∂au
= 0 ⇒ γu = c (28)
∂H
∂e
= 0 ⇒ ℓ0 + e = αs − αu. (29)
Some simple calculations show that qs and αs following from (23) und (25) given
(27) are identical to qM
s and U∗
s + ℓ0 for ρE = ρU. Similarly, the social planner’s
values of qu and αu following from (24) and (26) given (28) are equivalent to qM
u
and U∗
u. This guarantees that the social planner and the decentralized economy
have the same education threshold e. 2
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